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In June 1999, the United States Department of Commerce
(Commerce) received a petition from the Committee to Save Domestic
Oil, Inc. (SDO)1 for protection against market dumping of crude oil. The
petition was filed under section 701 (countervailing duty)2 and section 731
(anti-dumping) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 (Act), alleging
market dumping of crude oil by Venezuela, Mexico, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia.' Despite the backing of over thirty crude oil producing
associations,' Commerce found that SDO did not have sufficient industry
t Associate in Arts, Freed-Hardeman College (1972); Bachelor of Science in Commerce,
University of Louisville (1978); Masters in Hospital and Healthcare Administration, Ohio
State University (1988); Masters in International Relations, Troy State University (1998);
Juris Doctor, University of Tulsa College of Law (Dec. 2000).
1. The Committee to Save Domestic Oil, Incorporated, was formed as an association of
independent oil producers from the mid-west region of the United States. Interview with
Harold Harem, Founder and Chairman of Save Domestic Oil, Inc., in Enid, Okla. (Sept. 16,
1999).
2. "[A] countervailing duty is a customs levy designed to offset the effect of government
payments and other extraordinary economic benefits, generically referred to as 'subsidies,'
granted to foreign producers or exporters which distort competition in international trade."
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 383 (2d ed. 1991).
3. Dismissal of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Petitions: Certain Crude
Petroleum Oil Products From Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, 64 Fed. Reg.
44,480 (Aug. 16, 1999).
4. Gerald Karey, Anti-Dumping Group Appeals Decision, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEws,
Sept. 8, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
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support to continue the investigation, and the petition was dismissed on
August 16, 1999.'
SDO's petition alleged that
[i]n accordance with section 732(b) of the Act .. , imports of crude oil
from Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela are being, or are likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value within the meaning
of section 731 of the Act and that such imports are materially injuring,
or threatening material injury to, a regional industry in the United
States. In addition, in accordance with section 702(b)(1) of the Act, the
petitioner alleges that producers or exporters of crude oil from Iraq,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela received countervailable
subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Act.6
This particular petition is the first to request anti-dumping protection
and countervailing duties by the petroleum producing industry of the
United States.7 With petroleum, more commonly known as "crude oil,"
being the world's premier naturally occurring raw material, investigation is
merited.
Part II provides general background information on the importance of
crude oil, its market pricing and recent reasons for declining prices. From
the background, the discussion in Part III will turn to market dumping
generally and the investigation process of an alleged market dumping
incident. Part IV examines a party's standing and the determination of
industry support for a party's petition. Consideration of political pressure
upon the reviewer to dismiss the petition follows in Part V. And finally,
the impact of recent developments that may have lessened the petitioner's
urgency in this matter will be given in Part VI.
5. Dismissal of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Petitions: Certain Crude
Petroleum Oil Products From Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, 64 Fed. Reg. at
44,480. SDO appealed to the U.S. Court of International Trade on September 7, 1999. See
infra note 111. The case was heard September 19, 2000, and the court held that "ITA's
dismissal of SDO's petition.., was not in accordance with law." Save Domestic Oil v.
U.S., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1343 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000). The case was remanded to
Commerce to consider having ITA commence a preliminary investigation. Id. See
also Save Domestic Oil v. U.S., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000) (denying
defendant's motion for an extension of time and for a stay pending appeal). The
court's action supports this author's contention that Commerce's dismissal was based
on political influences. Save Domestic Oil, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 & n.17.
6, Id.
7. Rossella Brevetti & John Nagel, Dumping, Countervailing Duties: Petition Alleges




A. Save Domestic Oil, Inc.
The market price for a barrel of oil fell below $10 in December 1998
after a long and steady decline from approximately $32 a barrel in 1981.'
The abrupt fall of 50% from November 1997 to December 1998' was a
siren's warning to the American independent oil producers that their
viability to remain in the crude oil production business was in jeopardy.
Responding to this warning, a group of American independent producers
from the American mid-west region formed an association. Conveniently,
they named the new association "Save Domestic Oil, Inc." These
producers felt a need for a collective effort in regard to their shared
difficulties encountered by the very low price of a barrel of oil.' SDO,
comprised of more than 5,000 companies," took a bold step by filing an
anti-dumping and countervailing duty petition with Commerce.
B. Importance of Crude Oil
Availability of abundant and cheap petroleum is a major contributor
to the high standard of living achieved by the industrialized nations. The
derivatives of crude oil are wide-ranging and include such products as
fertilizers that enable farmers to increase yields, cheap fuels that enable
mobility and power industries, and building materials for homes, offices
and factories." More significantly, for the last 150 years, it has been
central to the quest for power and wealth by individuals and by sovereigns.
Sovereigns devote considerable time and energy toward economic and
diplomatic effort to secure access to petroleum. When these efforts fail,
sometimes they will resort to armed conflict. World-encompassing military
campaigns have been fought and their outcomes sometimes rested on
which sovereign had sustainable sources and supply of petroleum.
The latest example, where the importance of crude oil was at the
center of armed conflict, was the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. Thirty-
three sovereigns, unlikely alliances in some cases, came together to save
8. Jody M. Perkins, Economic State of the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and
Production Industry: Long-Term Trends and Recent Events 2 (Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished
paper, on file with the American Petroleum Institute).
9. Id.
10. Interview with Harold Hamm, supra note 1.
11. Russell Ray, Ruling Due on Claims of 'Dumped' Oil, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 7, 1999, at
El, available at 1999 WL 5409469.
12. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIc QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND
POWER (1992).
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Kuwait from the grip of Iraq. Central to this massive effort was the quest
for access to one of the world's leading oil-producing fields.'3
The dance of sovereigns in their quest for power and wealth seems
unlikely to end anytime soon. Though the major industrialized nations are
working to reduce their dependence upon petroleum, their efforts are
largely offset by the economic development of the industrializing nations.
With the world's population projected to grow by one billion in the next
decade and all likely to be demanding consumers, the mad quest for
petroleum is not likely to take a second seat to anything, including the
pursuit for the fastest and most efficient computing chip.
1 4
Though the United States was once the world's greatest producer of
petroleum, the major U.S. oil producing companies have turned their
interests to the major foreign oil fields.'5 The many "American
independent oilmen" now work those same fields by utilizing new, but
more costly, techniques to bring up the residual oil left in the old fields.
The "independents" can profit as long as the market price for crude oil
remains above their production costs. 6 It follows, then, that when world
prices for oil are depressed, the independent producer may suffer. But
when the world oil prices are high, they can profit.
C. Historical World Market Oil Prices
The price of a barrel of crude oil can be influenced by a variety of
reasons. The economic law of supply and demand is the basic driver. If
supply is up or demand is down, then prices go down. If supply goes down
or demand goes up, then prices go up. For example, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed to stop unilateral cuts
in oil prices by the major oil companies and to stabilize world prices at a
high level. 7 Also, the U.S. government has offered crude oil at public sale
from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve in an effort to stabilize rising oil
prices."
Even though the price of crude oil fluctuates in response to various
stimuli, an independent producer can plan based upon an average price.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Perkins, supra note 8, at 6.
16. Id. at 7.
17. YERGIN, supra note 12.
18. Jay Hakes, EIA Marks 25' Anniversary of 1973 Oil Embargo, Presentation by the
Department of Energy (Sept. 3, 1998), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/speeches/
25thann/sld009.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 1999).
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In the post World War II era oil prices have averaged $19.27 per barrel
in 1996 dollars. Through the same period the median price for crude oil
was $15.27 in 1996 prices. That means that only fifty percent of the time
from 1947 to 1997 have oil prices exceeded $15.26 per barrel.... Since
1869 US crude oil prices have averaged $18.63 per barrel. Fifty percent
of the time prices were below $14.91. 1 long term history is a guide,
those in the upstream segment of the crude oil industry should structure
their business to be able to operate, hopefully with a profit, below
$15.00 per barrel half of the time."L
D. Reasons for Recent Lower Prices
When worldwide demand for crude oil falls and adjustments in
production to counter the over-supply are not made, the overall world
price for crude oil should fall. The following occurrences are possible
contributors to the recent events.
The recent economic downturn in the Far East contributed to a
decrease in demand.2' Perhaps, more to the point, an expected increase in
demand from this region did not materialize.2 ' Demand for crude oil was
expected to increase by one million barrels per day. But instead, it is
expected to fall by almost 100,000 barrels per day.2
In the face of lower world prices, OPEC decided to increase
production quotas in November 1997. OPEC, after ignoring the economic
signals with the increased production quotas, delayed in responding to the
supply glut until April 1998.23 Even then, their response was weakened by
not fully complying with pledged cuts.2 4 World crude oil supplies have
been increased through the efforts of Iran and Iraq to "rebuild their oil
sectors after many years of warfare and hardship [and] ineffectual U.S.
policy ... [and] trade sanctions ... have done little to reverse the prospect
for still more growth in oil supplies from these two OPEC giants."2,
But, perhaps the most interesting possibility is the implementation of
a strategic initiative by a state-owned major oil producer-Petroleos de
19. James L. Williams, Oil Price Hisrory and Analysis, WTRG Economics, at
http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 1999).
20. Bob Williams, Oil Producers Face Key Question: How Long Will Prices Stay Low?,
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Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)." Faced with a declining world market and its
own increased production to maintain revenues, PDVSA conceived a plan
that "could slow the development and introduction of alternative energy
sources" and "force some high-cost producers, particularly in the United
States, out of business."27 If successful, the measure would reduce the
threat to the profitability of its future oil production."' The ground work
for increased future production was laid with implementation of "Apertura
Petrolera" (the opening). "[Tlhe central goal of the policy was to increase
Venezuela's productive capacity through... the development of its huge
resources of extra-heavy crude oil and the discovery of new fields of
medium and light crude outside of the traditional producing regions."29
"[Blut, to sustain a decline it [PVDSA] would need help from other
producers with excess capacity. 30
If true and if successful, the Venezuelan initiative could prove to be
economically disastrous for high-cost producers, i.e., the American
independent oil producer. "[E]conomic warfare had been declared on our
industry, the U.S. domestic producers... . Their plan was to drive the price
of oil down and hold it down as long as it took to plug those stripper wells.
They know that once those strippers are plugged they're gone forever." 1
It appears Venezuela may have initiated a "compact" with Mexico, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia to increase production, to suffer in the short-term the
resulting decrease in oil revenues, and to eventually benefit in the long
run.
E. Subsidies Generally
The market forces of supply and demand underpin the philosophy of
commercial freedom among buyers and sellers." "Government
26. PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela) is wholly owned by the Republic of Venezuela.
This state-owned petroleum company is involved in the exploration, production, refining,
distribution, and exploration of petroleum and petroleum products. It has 48,109
employees. PD VSA, 1999, LEXIS, Company & Financial, The Major Companies Database,
Reference No: L00608.
27. Jason Feer, PDVSA Officials Back Driving Down Prices; Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.,
OIL DAILY, Dec. 3, 1997, available at LEXIS, Publications Group.
28. Id.
29. Jay G. Martin, Venezuela as an Opportunity for Investment in the Petroleum Industry,
20 ENERGY L.J. 325, 328 (1999) (citing BAKER & McKENZtE GAS NEWSL., Mar. 1999, at 1).
30. Feer, supra note 27.
31. Chris Holly, Anti-Dumping Complaint Could Roil Oil Politics, ENERGY DAILY, July 1,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File (quoting Harold Hamm, CEO of Continental
Resources).
32. Sangham Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for
Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 593, 595 (1996).
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intervention is viewed as a distortion of free trade that causes a
misallocation of resources. Government sponsorship of specific industries
can stifle imports as well as promote exports beyond their unsubsidized
levels. In other words, government subsidies can act as a form of trade
barrier."03 In the world of international trade, "a subsidy shall be deemed
to exist if... there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory of... [said] government. "'
III. INVESTIGATION PROCESS
A. Market Dumping Generally
Market dumping is defined as the introduction of products by one
country into the commerce of another country where that product is priced
below its normal value. A product, to be considered as introduced at less
than its normal value, must be priced at a lower level than the price of that
product when offered for consumption within the exporting country.
When there is an absence of a market of such product within the exporting
country (therefore, no comparable domestic price), a determination may
be made by comparing the price in a third market or by comparing the cost
of production of the product. Where third market pricing or the cost of
production is less than the price in the importing country, then pricing at
less than normal value may be found.5 Market dumping is not prohibited,
per se. It "is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an
established industry... or materially retards the establishment of a
domestic industry.""'
The petitioner in a market dumping allegation must show injury or
threatened injury and that such injury was, or will be, caused by the
dumping. It follows, then, that a domestic producer can be injured while
33. id.
34. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, pt. I, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, available at LEXIS,
International Trade, Treaties & International Agreements.
35. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, pt. I, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, available at LEXIS, International Trade, Treaties & International
Agreements.
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 6.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, available a LEXIS, International Trade,
Treaties & International Agreements, GATT/WTO B.I.S.D. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D.
(4' Supp.) at 1 (1969) was modified extensively by the agreements reached in the Uruguay
Round and signed by the contracting parties in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.
These agreements created GATT 1994 which includes the original GATT 1947.
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market dumping is occurring, but, unless it is demonstrated that dumping
caused the injury, there is no basis to impose an anti-dumping duty.37
B. Authority to Act Upon Dumping
Article 5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 sets out the general
procedure for the initiation and subsequent investigation of an alleged
dumping practice. 8 The allegation must be made in writing "by or on
behalf of the domestic industry."39 The application "shall include evidence
of (a) dumping, (b) injury.., and (c) a causal link between the dumped
imports and the alleged injury."'  Simple assertions are not sufficient to
meet the test as there must be supporting evidence. 1
C. Investigation Initiation
There are two ways to initiate an anti-dumping investigation:
Commerce may self-initiate an investigation, or an interested party may
file a petition alleging the elements for imposing an anti-dumping duty.
42
"To initiate an investigation in response to a petition, Commerce must
'determine whether the petition alleges the elements necessary for the
imposition of a duty.. .' and 'determine if the petition has been filed by or
on behalf of the industry,' i.e., whether the domestic industry supports the
investigation." 43
In the SDO case, Commerce did not self-initiate the investigation.
SDO filed its petition on June 29, 1999 and made subsequent
"supplemental submissions during June, July, and August 1999."' 4
Upon receipt of a petition by Commerce, there are
37. Id. art. 6.6.
38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 art. 5.
39. Id. art. 5.1. Domestic industry refers to domestic producers "as a whole of the like
products or to those ... whose collective output of the products constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products." Exceptions are to be made
in the case of "related" producers. Id. art. 4.1.
40. Id. art. 5.2. An injury is determined by examining the volume of the dumped imports,
their effect on prices for like products in the domestic market, and their impact on domestic
producers of the products. Id. art. 3.1.
41. Id. art. 5.2.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)-(b) (1999). See also 19 C.F.R. § 351.201 (1999).
43. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1227, 1229 (1997) (quoting
19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1999)).
44. Dismissal of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Petitions: Certain Crude




distinct roles for [the] International Trade Administration and [for the]
International Trade Commission, such that [the] Administration must
determine [the] scope of investigation by determining class or kind of
merchandise subject to investigation, and if [the] Administration finds
that class or kind of merchandise is being sold at less than fair value,
[the] Commission then must determine whether Ithe] U.S. industry is
being injured, threatened with injury, or materially retarded by reason
of imports of that merchandise ....
"[Ain antidumping order can be issued only where the ITA's
[Administration] and the ITC's [Commission] determinations are both
affirmative.4 4' With SDO's petition, the investigation did not reach injury
determination by the Commission because the Administration did not find
that dumping had occurred.
IV. STANDING
A. Standing
The initial consideration is whether SDO, as a trade association, has
standing. The first rule is: "Parties lacking a real stake in the outcome of
antidumping litigation do not have standing. 47 Analysis begins with a
determination as to whether the filing party can be considered an
"interested party." "The term 'interested party' is defined to include inter
alia: a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States
importer, of merchandise which is the subject of an investigation under this
subtitle ... "
The first test that Commerce applied was whether the petition
qualified as an interested party. The term "interested party" as defined by
statute is a rather broad term that encompasses a wide spectrum of
entities. Among the entities are domestic or foreign manufacturers and
producers of subject goods; foreign exporters and domestic importers of
subject goods; foreign governments where subject good is manufactured,
produced, or exported; wholesalers; unions and business associations
where a majority of the membership is engaged in the production,
manufacture, or wholesale of the subject goods; and agricultural
producers, processors, and growersY'
45. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673a, at n.1 (1999).
46. Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 213, 216 (1985).
47. Brother Indus. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 150, 152 (1990).
48. Id.
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1999).
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[U]nless a petition[er] is either a producer, union, or trade association
within that industry, it cannot acquire "interested party" status in an
antidumping proceeding [citation omitted]. This fairly narrow
circumscription closes the door on groups such as, for example, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the American Association of Exporters and Importers - groups which
could conceivably muster majority support within a specific industry for
an antidumping petition, but which could not attain "interested party"
status under section 1677(9).50
If there is opposition to a petition from within the industry,
Commerce follows a prescribed procedure. For example, the North
Atlantic Fisheries Task Force (NAFTF), an unincorporated association
representing fishermen, fishermen's cooperatives, and processors located
in the northeastern United States, filed a petition for countervailing duties
on imports of fresh Atlantic groundfish from Canada. Commerce
received telephone calls and telexes from domestic processors who
objected to NAFTF's petition.52 Because of those objections, Commerce
examined the question of whether NAFTF's petition was filed "on behalf
of" a United States industry. 3 Commerce then confirmed that almost all
of the firms expressing opposition to the petition were importers of the
subject merchandise from Canada-"4 The opposition from those producers
and wholesalers logically stems from their position as importers because
they might be faced with a countervailing subsidy payment if the
investigation resulted in a finding of dumping.5 Commerce, claiming its
right of discretion, chose to exclude those objecting importers in its
determination of standing for NAFTFF. 6
So, too, with SDO's petition, domestic importers of crude oil objected.
But, Commerce found SDO to qualify as an interested party under section
771(9)(E) of the Act despite such objections. 7
50. Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 219, 226 (1984).
51. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Fresh Atlantic






57. Dismissal of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Petitions: Certain Crude
Petroleum Oil Products From Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, 64 Fed. Reg.




Until the Uruguay Round agreements, Commerce allowed a
presumption of petitioner's standing, that is, that the petition was filed on
behalf of the industry. It was not until a majority of the domestic
companies affirmatively opposed the petition that the presumption was
discarded. The burden of proof fell upon those opposing the petition to
prove that the opponents represented more than 50% of the domestic
production. The Uruguay agreement, however, challenged that
presumption by requiring that:
[i] the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account
for at least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like
product, and
[ii] the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account
for more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product
produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or
opposition to the petition."
An interesting problem arises when determining how to calculate
industry support. In an industry such as the petroleum industry, the
industry members range from large producers such as Chevron, at 118
million barrels of domestic production per year,55 to small producers like
Kincaid Oil Producers, which produces less than 25,000 barrels per year."'
The question that arises is should each business entity get one vote or
should the votes be weighted according to production.
There are domestic producers who "directly or indirectly control joint
ventures with PDVSA in the production of crude oil in Venezuela."'" For
example, Conoco joined PDVSA in a joint investment venture to develop
58. Tariff Act of 1930 § 702, 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (1999).
59. Press Release, Chevron Opposes Oil Import Duty and Anti-Dumping Petitions (July
22, 1999), at http://www.chevron.comlnewsvs/pressrel/1999/1999%2DO7%2D22.html (last
visited Dec. 21, 1999).
60. Memorandum from The Industry Support Team, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Richard
W. Moreland, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Commerce attachment A, chart 1
(Aug. 9, 1999) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Commerce, discussing Calculation of Industry-
Support Percentages).
61. Letter from Charles Verrill, Jr., Counsel to Petitioners, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, to The
Honorable William M. Daley, U.S. Secretary of Commerce (Aug. 3, 1999) (on file with
author).
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a portion of the Orinoco Heavy-Oil Belt.62 Conoco has a controlling
interest of 50.1% of the joint venture." "[In 2000, 64,000 bbl/d will be sent
to Conoco's refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana." ' Another example is a
"joint venture among PDVSA (41.67%), Mobil (41.67%), and Veba Oel
(16.66%)."65 This project "was designed to produce, upgrade, and market
120,000 b/d of extra-heavy crude.... [U]pgrading of heavy oil from this
project is expected to occur largely in the United States at a refinery in
Chalmette, Louisiana, jointly owned by Mobil and Citgo." And lastly,
there is the Petrolera Ameriven project that "is a heavy crude upgrading
partnership... between PDVSA (30%) and several U.S. companies,
including Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) (30%), Phillips Petroleum Co.
(20%) and Texaco Inc. (20%). ',67
It can be complicated even further by considering that many oil
companies may have ownership or partnership interests that are shared.
For example, PDVSA owns 50% of UNO-VEN Co.,68 a refiner and
marketer in the mid-west United States. 9 Should such companies be
excluded in the calculation due to their interests in the foreign production
that they import into the United States? Whose support or non-support
should be considered and used in the industry support calculation? Could
some large multi-faceted producers be getting more than one vote because
of control relationships or business ties?
These considerations become pivotal when one looks at the
methodology in which Commerce conducted its industry support analysis.
In order to make an industry support determination, Commerce surveyed
the "domestic" producers. For the survey, Commerce created two
groupings: group A which consisted of the top 410 producers by volume of
crude oil production and group B which consisted of all remaining
62. The Orinoco Heavy-Oil Belt is a 270-mile by 40-mile strip that has the largest heavy
oil reserves in Venezuela. The Venezuelan government has encouraged the development
of numerous strategic associations consisting of joint ventures between PDVSA and private
sector companies to increase production in this lucrative region. Martin, supra note 29, at
331.




67. Id. at 333.
68. PDVSA, supra note 26.
69. Worldwide Operations: UNO-VEN, at http://www.pdv.com/english/filialesunoven
en.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2000).
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producers.7 All producers in group A were sent a survey. However, for
group B, a sampling by production stratum was performed. Group B
companies were grouped into ten strata by production increments of
25,000 barrels." The number of surveys sent out by stratum was
determined by the relative production of each stratum over total
production."
The outcome of this analytical approach was that the major oil
companies were all given an opportunity to voice their support or non-
support for the petition. In contrast, only a percentage of independent
producers were given such opportunity. To confound the analysis further,
for the non-responding companies in group A, Commerce projected
support or opposition based upon the percentages of support or opposition
from the responding companies. 3 It seems rather more appropriate to
presume such non-responding companies to be neutral on the issue.
Hence, with approximately three-quarters of the group A responding
major producers voicing opposition,v" approximately three-quarters of the
non-responding and presumably neutral companies were additionally
counted as being in opposition to the petition.
This same calculation was applied to group B companies. In this
group, 99% of the responding companies supported the petition.' As in
group A, 99% of the production in this group was then considered to be in
support of the petition. However, because it is the volume of production
that is used as a standard of measure for industry support, the greater
production numbers of group A prevailed over the production numbers of
group B.
The support or opposition of workers within the industry is to be
accounted for, as well as the support or opposition of management. The
test for industry support is whether "the domestic producers or workers
who support the petition account for" domestic production of like
product.6 In cases where management and workers disagree, Commerce
should make the industry support calculation in a manner that does not
negate the expression of workers.




73. Id at 3.
74. Id. at chart 3.
75. Id.
76- 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (1999) (emphasis added).
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The Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers
International Union (PACE), representing 320,000 workers, supported
SDO's petition.7 PACE represents workers with "Vastar, Permian,
Occidental, Rayburn Oil, Teavee Oil and Gas, Union Oil, BP/Amoco,
ARCO, Mobil Oil, and Texaco. 78 In these instances, the support of the
workers was negated where the opposition of the oil companies was
considered in the industry support calculation.
The inclusion of the domestic companies that are also importers of
crude oil could be questioned. In determining standing, Commerce claims
to have discretion in excluding domestic industry opposition in its
consideration.7 9 For this reason, with domestic importers objecting to the
NAFTF petition, Commerce did not go on to consider whether NAFTF
had sufficient industry support to continue the investigation. However,
with SDO's petition and with domestic importers objecting, Commerce did
go on to calculate industry support. This seems inconsistent.
One might think that Commerce is obliged to suspend an
investigation once it finds insufficient industry support. In Commerce's
analysis of industry support in Gilmore Steel, the court stated "the
'interested party' criterion.., is thus the first in a two-step shifting process
- not only must a petitioner be a member of the affected industry, i.e., be
an 'interested party,' it must also show that a majority of that industry
backs its petition. ' However, Commerce has recognized that
there is nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or our regulations
which requires that petitioners establish affirmatively that they have the
support of a majority of their industries. In many cases, such a
requirement would be so onerous as to preclude access to import relief
under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.8
77. Letter from Charles Verrill, Jr., Counsel to Petitioners, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, to The
Honorable William M. Daley, U.S. Secretary of Commerce attachment 1 (July 30, 1999)
(on file with author). Attachment 1 is a letter dated July 29, 1999 from Robert E. Wages,
Executive Vice President of PACE to The Honorable William M. Daley indicating PACE's
support of SDO's petition.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Fresh Atlantic
Groundfish From Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 1010, 1011 (Jan. 9, 1986). See discussion supra Part
IV.A regarding NAFTF petition.
80. Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 219, 226 (1984).
81. Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice From Brazil: Final Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value, 52 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (Mar. 17, 1987).
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Is Commerce required to dismiss a petition that has failed to
demonstrate the support of the majority of a domestic industry? The court
in Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States declined to impose such a
requirement and cited Gilmore Steel and Oregon Steel Mills in support of
its position.'2 In the 1988 Citrosuco Paulista case, involving frozen
concentrated orange juice, Commerce excluded opposition from firms
where each of such firm's imports exceeded 50% of that firm's total
production.? Commerce relied upon the "related parties" statute for its
decision to exclude such firms." The statute read: "When some producers
are related to the exporters or importers, or are themselves importers of
the allegedly subsidized or dumped merchandise, the term 'industry' may
be applied in appropriate circumstances by excluding such producers from
those included in that industry.""
Citrosuco then argued "that Commerce acted ultra vires in using this
statute." 6 The argument, suggesting that "the provision was intended for
the [International Trade] Commission rather than Commerce,"'7 was based
upon legislative history. The court refused this argument because
"Commerce has taken the position that firms with large imports of the
allegedly dumped or subsidized merchandise may be excluded from the
definition of the domestic industry, because they inherently lack the stake
in the final investigation being pursued by the petitioner.""" The court
found "it reasonable for Commerce to apply 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1982)
to exclude producers who derive a majority of their production from the
imports under investigation."9
In a case where a company was a domestic producer as well as an
importer, Commerce stated that it had authority to disregard its position
against a petition filed for an anti-dumping investigation. The Coalition
for Fair Preserved Mushroom Trade (CFPMT) filed a petition in 1998
wherein it alleged that imports of preserved mushrooms from Chile, India,
Indonesia, and the People's Republic of China were, or were likely, to be
sold in the United States at less than fair market value.' Commerce found
82. Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 1196, 1205 (1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1982)).




90. Initiation of Antidumping Investigations: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from Chile,
India, Indonesia, and the People's Republic of China, 63 Fed. Reg. 5360, 5361 (Feb. 2,
1998).
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CFPMT to be an interested party with industry support. Giorgio Foods
Inc., a domestic producer as well as an importer of the subject
merchandise, expressed opposition to the investigation with respect to
preserved mushrooms from India.91 Commerce side-stepped a decision on
whether to include or exclude Giorgio's position in its determination of
industry support by noting that supporters of the petition, including
Giorgio, accounted for over 50% of the production of the domestic
producers expressing an opinion.' It appears Commerce recognized the
legitimacy of excluding a domestic producer of the subject merchandise of
an investigation when that producer is also an importer of the subject
merchandise.
The major oil companies have been shifting more of their exploration
and production activities to locations outside the United States. They have
reduced domestic development expenditures from about $20 billion in
1985 to roughly $8.5 billion in 1995.93 At the same time, their foreign
investment increased from $7 billion to about $8.5 billion.9' Should these
domestic companies, who have lessened their domestic crude oil
exploration and production operations and have substantial domestic
operations that use imported crude oil in their refining and distribution
functions, be included in the analysis?
The petitioner suggests that such parties should be discounted95 from
the analysis because they are (1) not crude oil producers within the region
of producers on whose behalf SDO has petitioned, and (2) such parties are
related parties96 to the foreign importers. In the end, though, section
91. Id. at 5362.
92. Id.
93. Perkins, supra note 8, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Memorandum from The Industry Support Team, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Richard
W. Moreland, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1 (Aug. 9, 1999) (on
file with U.S. Dep't of Commerce, discussing Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Petitions Regarding Crude Oil). See 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677(4)(C) (1999). The United States
may be divided up into two or more market regions where (1) the producers within such
market sell all or almost all of their production of the domestic like product in that market,
and (2) the demand in that market is not supplied, to any substantial degree, by producers
outside of the region.
96. Memorandum from The Industry Support Team to Richard Moreland, supra note 95,
at 2. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677(4)(B) (1999). If a regional producer of the domestic like
product is also an importer of the product, the producer may be excluded from the industry
as a related party where (1) the producer directly or indirectly controls the exporter or
importer, (2) the exporter or importer directly or indirectly controls the producer, (3) a
third party directly or indirectly controls the producer and the exporter or importer, or (4)
the producer and the exporter or importer directly or indirectly control a third party and
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732(c)(4)(B)(i) requires Commerce to disregard related producers who
oppose the petition unless such producers "demonstrate that their interests
as domestic producers would be adversely affected by the imposition of an
antidumping duty order."" Where producers are also importers,
subsection (B)(ii) allows Commerce to disregard them as interested
parties. Commerce chose, however, to poll such domestic producers.
These producers expressed to Commerce that they opposed the petition.
The suggestion is that these included producers had interests in
maintaining a cheap supply of imported oil. Commerce's leeway to either
include or disregard the related parties allowed it to disregard producers
who have moved away from their domestic production of crude oil and
now rely heavily upon cheap imported oil. Is it "possible for large
integrated producers who import to have a common stake with the
petitioner?""
For example, the petitioners argued that "Conoco, Total, Arco,
Texaco, Phillips, and Mobil Oil" owned shares with PDVSA2 The
petitioner argued that these companies have become related parties
because of their current business pursuits. These pursuits have moved
such major domestic companies away from domestic exploration and
production toward greater dependence on their refining capacities. Their
interests are better furthered, as a refiner and not as a producer of crude
oil, in maintaining a supply of imported crude oil. The petitioner
supported this notion by noting that Mobil has stated that it "refines
imported crude because its refining capacity is substantially greater than its
domestic crude production capacity......
To illustrate further the impact of the movement by domestic majors
from exploration of domestic crude oil to refining imported crude oil, the
petitioner noted that one of Mobil's subsidiaries, Mobil Exploration and
Producing U.S. Inc. (MEP), had recently "filed a 'Certification Eligibility
Request: Worker Adjustment Assistance,' with the Department of Labor
on July 7, 1994."" - The petitioner further noted that MEP itself stated that
"increased imports have caused a decline in sales and production of
there is reason to believe that the relationship causes the producer to act differently than a
non-related producer.
97. Memorandum from The Industry Support Team to Richard Moreland, supra note 95,
at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Letter from Charles Verrill to The Honorable William Daley, supra note 61, at 1.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.
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Companies's [sic] products. ' 3 MEP, as quoted by the petitioner, "blamed
'imported natural resources' pricing advantages' for worker separations
and revenue declines.' 1 "
In this case we see that Mobil's overall interests may be better served
if the crude oil supply from imports is not disturbed by anti-dumping
protection and countervailing duties as requested by SDO. However,
Mobil's domestic crude oil production subsidiary, MEP, might be
benefited if the petitioner is correct in its assertions and the protective
measures are carried out. In keeping with its overall interests, Mobil,
along with other similarly situated large companies, has elected not to
support the petitioner. However, under this scenario, it seems proper for
Commerce to exclude Mobil and other similarly situated companies as
related parties in the determination of industry support and not include
them as members of the domestic crude oil production industry.
C. American Petroleum Institute's View (API)"°
An Ad Hoc Free Trade Committee" (Committee) weighed in on the
related party issue by arguing that the larger companies should not argue
whether there is a control relationship between them and the countries
alleged to be dumping. Rather, the Committee stated that the companies
should stand on their positions as domestic producers of crude oil and their
other interests should not be considered. By taking this position, API
attempts to avoid argument over such terms as "designated customers"
and potentially the other forms of their business relationships.'O
Commerce avoided that issue with its declaration that SDO did not
have industry support. It would seem more logical that Commerce should
have inquired into the related party issue in order to determine who
should be included and excluded in the determination of industry support.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3.
105. The American Petroleum Institute is a major national trade association that was
formed in 1919. It claims to represent the entire petroleum industry. It is headquartered in
Washington, D.C. and has petroleum councils in thirty-three states. API in Brief at
http:fiwww.api.org/about/aboutindex.htm (last modified Sept. 9, 1999).
106. ARCO, BHP Petroleum, BP Amoco, Burlington Resources, Chevron, Conoco,
Exxon, Fina, Kerr-McGee, Marathon Oil, Mobil, Murphy Oil, Occidental Petroleum,
Phillips Petroleum, Shell Oil and Texaco are members of the Committee. See





Section 732 of the Act allows Commerce to "disregard the position of
domestic producers of a domestic like product who are importers of the
subject merchandise." "' Why did Commerce not disregard the opposition
to SDO's petition from those producers who were also crude oil importers
when section 732(c)(4)(B)(ii) clearly allows the administering agency to do
so? Political considerations may have influenced Commerce's decision.
SDO alleged unprecedented official opposition from the Executive
Branch by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 9 Though DOE has no
role in an anti-dumping investigation, Secretary Bill Richardson involved
DOE with news releases, telephone calls, meetings with representatives of
the governments of the nations from which the dumping was alleged to
have occurred, and discussions with representatives from SDO."' In
SDO's appeal to the U.S. Court of International Trade, it claimed that the
DOE Secretary, Bill Richardson, "played an 'informal role in adjudicating
these petitions since he publicly promised the Saudi government that the
US government did not support the petitions and they [sic] he personally
was trying to 'fix' the problem.""..
A few months later, SDO, without fanfare or stating a reason, decided
to drop its allegation of improper influence by Secretary Richardson in its
appeal to the U.S. Court of International Trade."2 It is curious that a
leading Washington law firm would suggest an angle of attack in its appeal
to the court only later to withdraw it. There is no foul in changing tactics if
108. Tariff Act of 1930 § 732, 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673a(c)(4)(B)(ii) (1999).
109. Letter from Charles Verrill, Jr., Counsel to Petitioners, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, to Leo
Gordon, U.S. Ct. of Int'l Trade, Appellant's Compl. 9 (Sept. 7, 1999) (on file with
author).
110. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Statement of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
Following His Meeting with Save Domestic Oil, Inc. (July 20, 1999), at
http://www.doe.gov/news/releases99/julpr/pr99188.htm. See also News Release, U.S. Dep't
of Energy, Statement of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson (July 15, 1999), at
http//www.doe.gov/news/releases99/julpr99179.htm; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Statement of Secretary of Energy Richardson on Anti-Dumping Petition Filed by Save
Domestic Oil, Inc. (June 29, 1999), at http://www.doe.gov/news/releases99/junpr/
pr99167.htm; Karey, supra note 4: Gerald Karey, U.S. Oil Group Opposes DOE Head's
Role, PLATrr'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 5, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File; Gerald
Karey, U.S. DOE Chief to Attempt to Mediate Dumping Row, PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS,
July 16, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
111. Cathy Landry, Anti-Dumping Appeal Filing Set for Sep 7, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS,
Sept. 7, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
112. Eric Kronenwetter, SDO Drops Complaint About U.S. from Appeal, OIL DAILY,
Oct. 18, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
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a better one is found or an objective changes. However, objectives can be
changed by political pressure. The Clinton Administration may have
applied such pressure directly to SDO and/or its legal representative to
drop the issue.
As an alternative motive for the Clinton Administration to quash
investigation by Commerce in deference to the major oil producing
companies, it could have been a matter of avoiding the predicament of
announcing simultaneously two separate opposing findings from two
different agencies within Commerce.113 The Administration had launched
"an inquiry under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to determine
how rising crude and product imports are affecting U.S. energy security....
It was reported that "Commerce... plans to expedite the Section 232
study and issue a report by July 26 [1999]."1"H "Similar investigations in
1975, 1979, 1988, and 1995 determined that rising imports threatened
national security.'." 6 With imports even higher today, why should we
expect a dissimilar conclusion this time? "It would have been
embarrassing for one commerce department agency to declare that
growing oil prices were a national security threat while another asserted




After SDO's announcement that it would drop its allegation of
improper influence by Secretary Richardson in its appeal to the U.S. Court
of International Trade, the Clinton Administration apparently felt free to
be more open in its attentiveness to the matter. Secretary Richardson
made plans to visit Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico, Kuwait, and
Norway."' During his visit in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Richardson stated
that the current world's production of crude oil is approximately seventy-
three million barrels per day, which is about two million barrels short of
the world's daily consumption rate."9 While noting this shortfall, the
current high price of a barrel of oil, and the importance of price
stabilization, he urged, "[u]nless action is taken, the situation will get
worse." 20 He also noted that low prices discourage investment in
113. Patrick Crow, Imports Study, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 17, 2000, at 22, available at 2000 WL
14255918.
114. Patrick Crow, IPAA Backs Petition Alleging Crude Oil Dumping, OIL & GAS J.,
May 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9723870.
115. Id.
116. Crow, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. The Saudi Arabian Information Resource, U.S. Energy Secretary Visits Saudi Arabia,





production and create hardships for American small producers. ' " Though
the Clinton Administration appears to oppose the anti-dumping petition, it
does acknowledge the hardships currently faced by the American
independent producer.
Lastly, the Under-Secretary of Commerce, David Aaron, verbalized
another reason for Commerce's apparent ease for dismissing the SDO
petition. He "acknowledged that the petition had the capacity to set
precedent." '" In this case, if the petition were successful, it would be "the
first extension of the dumping law to a non-agricultural commodity."-123
The prospect of setting this precedent by extending protection to crude oil
producers "provoked considerable discomfort at the Commerce
Department.' 24
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Successfil Petition Might Have Opposite Effect of Petitioner's Desire
The opponents of the petition argued that ultimately it would be the
American consumer who would suffer due to the increased price in crude
oil. "The result [by imposing stiff tariffs] would have been higher gas and
energy prices ... "'2 But, the end result could be the opposite. SDO has
requested anti-dumping duties "up to 84.37 percent on Saudi Arabian
crude, 33.37 percent duty on Mexican imports, 177.52 percent on
Venezuelan imports and 102.61 percent on Iraqi crude."'26 In addition, it
seeks "a countervailing duty of $6.18 per barrel.., to offset average
subsidies ... paid [by the governments of each country] to help produce
and bring the oil to market. ' 27
The magnitude for the U.S.'s market of such unilateral action of
imposing remedial tariffs on crude oil from the alleged offending countries
is demonstrated by the following data. Total U.S. crude oil imports rose
steadily over the 1990s to 10.7 million barrels per day in 1998. '" "In recent
years, the collective shares of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela have
121. Id.
122. Agence France-Presse, U.S. Dismisses Anti-Dumping Petition on Crude Oil, Aug. 10,
1999, available at 1999 WL 2651939.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Russell Ray, Domestic Oil Group Trips Over Hurdle, TULSAWORLD. Aug. 10, 1999, at
El (citing Gary Hutbauer, a trade expert at the Institute for International Economics).
126. Holly, supra note 31.
127. Id.
128. PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., MARKET IMPACTS OF "DUMPING" AND
"COUNTERVAILING" DUTIES 2 (Aug. 1999).
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been approximately stable at about 45% of total imports.... ,,1 2 These
three alone account for almost 50% of total U.S. imports of crude oil.
Though imports of crude oil to the United States from Iraq ceased in
the early 1990s as a result of United Nations sanctions,1 "" those sanctions
have been relaxed to allow Iraq to sell oil in order to raise revenues to be
used for humanitarian purposes.13 Consequently, "[i]n the first four
months of 1999, imports of Iraqi oil reached 7% of the total... and pushed
the combined share of imports for the four countries to just under 50%. '132
"In volumetric terms, the four countries supplied 4.4 MMB/D [million of
barrels per day] of U.S. total crude oil imports of 8.7 MMB/D in 1998."'' 3
Accordingly, SDO's petition could have directly impacted over 50% of the
crude oil now imported by the United States.
Though the crude oil flow potentially affected by the petition is
significant for the United States, it represents a much lesser impact in
terms of world flows. "[T]he total volume of internationally traded oil is
about 40 MMB/D." ' Therefore, the U.S. crude oil imports from the
named countries represent approximately 11% of oil traded
internationally. Though the affected imports could still enter the U.S.
market, in theory it could also be re-routed to other world markets where
it would not be subjected to increased tariffs or duties.
If Venezuela and Mexico chose to re-route their exports to other
markets to avoid the increased tariffs and duties, these countries would
probably incur increased costs to transport the crude oil to those more
distant markets. So, whether Venezuela and Mexico re-routed their
production or continued to market in the United States, they will face
increased costs and will probably have to substantially increase production
to maintain their budgeted crude oil revenues. Additionally, the United
States would have to find replacement imports. Though the American
independent producers would like to fill that vacuum with their
production, they may not be able to fill the entire vacuum if it were
created. The sources for the replacement imports would undoubtedly be
more distant than the Venezuelan and Mexican producers and, therefore,
would be more expensive due to transportation costs.
A possibility exists that the other Persian Gulf crude oil exporting






134. PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., supra note 128.
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"producers exported about 5.2 MMB/D, of which only about 6% went to
the U.S.... [andi [m]ost of this group's oil was moving to long-haul
destinations in Asia." :  Therefore, these countries could switch markets
with Saudi Arabia. Their production could move from Asian markets to
U.S. markets, and Saudi Arabia's production could move to Asian
markets. This switch would involve very little difference in transportation
costs.
131
But Venezuela's and Mexico's situation is much different. "In 1998,
89% of Mexico's exports went to the U.S., as did 61% of Venezuelan
exports. -13 7 Should they decide to avoid the increased U.S. tariffs and send
their exports elsewhere, it means substituting a short-haul market for long-
haul markets. A consequential increase in transportation costs and
corresponding erosion of their net revenues would result.
This erosion in revenue could encourage them to increase supplies in an
attempt to protect their revenue. This could undermine the unity and
effectiveness of OPEC, and non-OPEC producers by adding
incremental supply to the market. This in turn would lower prices,
which is the last thing any producer (domestic or otherwise) wants to
see. Thus, ironically the plaintiffs might be able to achieve what
consumers and consumer countries have been unsuccessful at achieving,
that is driving a wedge between the effectiveness of the current
producer cartel.'9
Perhaps, then, from a consumer point of view, the petition should be
supported. However, it would be a gamble. Attraction or aversion to risk
varies with each individual. Whatever the outcome might have been, it
would surely have caused some anxiety to both producers and consumers.
B. It May be a Moot Issue Now
As noted in Part II, world oil prices seem to dictate whether
American independent oil producers operate profitably or at a loss. When
world prices are below the independents' cost of production, the
independent operator loses money. When the world prices are higher than
the independents' cost of production, the independent operator makes
money. Because OPEC members together produce a significant
percentage of the world's crude oil supply, it has opportunity to cause the
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world price of crude oil to rise and to remain at a relatively higher level.
However, history shows that OPEC has at times had difficulty in
maintaining successful outcomes in such endeavors. Accordingly, any
group of American independent oil producers would have little effect in
changing world prices.
"[T]he price of crude oil has more than doubled.., from $11" a barrel
that was posted earlier in 1999.' 39 The reason might be due to an initiative
of the Mexican Energy Minister, Luis K. Tellez.' ° When Dr. Tellez began
his initiative, "he was worried about the devastating impact that falling oil
prices were having on the economy in Mexico, which in 1997 relied on oil
for 38 percent of its revenues.'.'. Quietly, "within a year he was able to
persuade a few key oil ministers and officials from Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela to form a new coalition of oil-producing nations.' '142 "Tellez
managed to break through the wall of paralysis-mainly with what he
called 'gentlemen's agreements' among Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and
Mexico.' ' 43 "Despite skepticism that the new group would be able to stick
together, oil prices began to recover quickly, from $14.65 a barrel in March
[1998] to $17 a month later."'' 4 Though the Asian economic downturn
reversed much of this success, the group held together and coordinated
another round of production cuts in 1999. The cuts totaled 5.3 million
barrels a day, and the price rose to $23.45 a barrel. 45 "If the oil exporters
stay with their cuts, inventories of oil will run down hard and push the
price up to close to $30."""' At these higher prices, SDO members can
operate profitably, rendering the issue moot in reality. However, the issue
may not be moot legally, as SDO may hold their appeal for use in the near
future.
139. New York Times, Mexico Helps Unite OPEC Cartel, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 14, 1999, at
El.
140. Dr. Tellez is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he
received a Ph.D. in Economics. Having occupied various high level positions in the
Mexican government and serving as Chief of Staff to Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo,
he was then appointed Minister of Energy in October 1997. Introduction at the Council of
the Americas Conference, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., (May 2, 2000) in
Federal News Service. See also Andrew Downie, Zedillo Picks Close Aide to be New
Energy Minister, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 23, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Group
File.
141. New York Times, supra note 139, at El.
142. Id. at E5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at El, E5.
146. Id. at El (quoting Frederick Leuffer, an oil analyst at Bear Stearns).
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C. Commerce's Determination is Appealable
Commerce's determination to dismiss SDO's petition was a final
action and could then be appealed. "[Ajn interested party who is a party
to... [either a countervailing or anti-dumping duty] proceeding in
connection with which the matter arises may commence an action in the
United States Court of International Trade .... '4' SDO exercised its
option and filed an appeal on September 7, 1999.14. SDO Chairman,
Harold Hamm, and SDO President, Michael Cantrell, gave several reasons
for the decision to proceed with an appeal. "' First, federal judges receive
lifetime appointments and are not susceptible to political pressure.
Second, Commerce decisions are often overturned."' Third, attorneys for
SDO advised there was an 80% chance of winning the appeal, and if
successful, the petition would be returned to Commerce for a review on
the petition's merits.5 2 Last, since the appeals process consumes
considerable time (about a year), the pending matter would act to pressure
the foreign producers into keeping their crude oil production in check.'53
The estimated cost of $150,000 to proceed with the appeal was
apparently considered to be a worthy investment because the appeal was
filed.
D. Alternatives
If supporting the independent oil producers is not possible, or at least
not likely, with relief under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
provisions, what then, if anything, can the American government do to
provide further support for this significant sector of the American
economy?
1. Trade Expansion Act of 1930, Section 232 Consideration
In this century, petroleum has always been a vital resource for the
world's industrialized nations. Its importance is great enough to warrant its
consideration as a strategic resource. Dependence upon imported
petroleum can be a weakness easily targeted by an opposing country. The
147. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(1) (1999).
148. Letter from Charles Verrill to Leo Gordon, supra note 109.
149. Eric Kronenwetter, U.S. Independents Group Claims 80% Odds of Success in Appeal
of Anti-Dumping Ruling (Save Domestic Oil Inc. May Appeal Dismissal of Anti-Dumping
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United States has had the good fortune for most of the past century to
have sufficient domestic oil fields to meet the needs of the country.
However, as the domestic fields have been depleted, dependence upon
imported petroleum has become significant. One has only to think back to
the 1973 OPEC oil embargo to see the immediate impact of a shortage of
oil.
One might question why SDO did not argue for an investigation
under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to determine the
effects on the national security by petroleum imports.'55 Section 232 does
not state the criteria in which to judge the impact of an imported item on
national security. It seems, though, that a compelling argument could be
made that maintaining a domestic oil production industry is a reasonable
consideration in the overall scheme of national security.
2. Royalty Relief
Several billion dollars in royalties shared with the federal and state
governments have been under consideration since 1995 when the Minerals
Management Service announced its intention to change the rules for how
oil and natural gas produced on federal lands is valued.156 Subsequently,
Congress and President Clinton promulgated the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act. 7 Since then, the Minerals
Management Service, the oil industry, and Congress have grappled over
how to develop the governing regulations.' 8 Speaking for the American
independent crude oil producers, the Chairman of the Independent
Petroleum Association of America's Land and Royalty Committee, Mr.
Diemer True, stated before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, that there
was much needed improvement in the Minerals Management Services'
rule-making. Reduction in regulatory burdens on the independents could
be realized by "[s]implifying the royalty collection process... [piroviding
155. See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232 (b)(I)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (2000).
"Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested
party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce ... shall immediately initiate an
appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of the
article which is the subject of such request, application, or motion." Id.
156. Am. Geological Inst., Oil Royalty and Valuation Update (Jan. 27, 2000), at
http://www.agiweb.org/gap/legisO6/oilvalue.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2000).
157. Statement of President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1975, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1448 (Aug. 13, 1996).
158. Am. Geological Inst., supra note 156.
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certainty in the royalty valuation system... [and] [m]aximizing taxpayer
dollars.'"'
Congress presently has three house bills and two senate bills under
consideration to provide fair valuation of oil and gas royalties. The
Strategic Reserve Replenishment Act of 1999 allows for the replenishment
of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SRP) by accepting royalty-in-kind oil.
It calls for at least 100,000 barrels per day be accepted until the SRP
capacity is reached." However, this bill may be more of an effort to
restore the SRP than to address the fairness of oil and gas royalties in
general. The Federal Oil and Gas Reform Act of 1999 seeks to improve
compliance of the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982
through stronger sanctions for violations relating to oil and gas royalties.'61
The Federal Oil and Gas Lease Management Improvement Act of 1999
takes a broad approach in that it would transfer oil and gas industry
regulation of exploration and production on federal lands. This measure
would remove the federal government's conflicted interests of being both
oil and gas owner and industry regulator.62 The Federal Royalty Certainty
Act adds a proviso to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act addressing
the payments of royalties whether due in value or due in amount.63
3. Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan
Congress has already acted to provide relief to the oil industry by
passing the Emergency Steel Loan Guarantee and Emergency Oil and Gas
Guaranteed Loan Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-51).6 Signed into law by
President Clinton on August 17, 1999, the bill was intended by Congress
"to help ... oil/gas firms that were impacted by the.., oil and gas import
cris[ils.', 6  By the February 28, 2000 deadline, twenty-three loan
159. Press Release, Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am., America's Oil and Natural Gas
Producers Call on Congress to Adopt the Royalty Enhancement Act of 1998: A Win-Win-
Win for the Federal Government, Taxpayer and America's Oil and Natural Gas Industry
(Mar. 19, 1998), at http://www.ipaa.org/departments/communications/PR1998/PR031998
_2.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2000).
160. H.R. 498, 106t" Cong. (1" Sess. 1999).
161. H.R. 1269, 106h Cong. (1" Sess. 1999).
162. H.R. 1985, 106h Cong. (1" Sess. 1999). See also S. 1049, 1061, Cong. (1" Sess. 1999).
163. S. 924, 106" Cong. (1" Sess. 1999).
164. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1841 (2000).
165. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Emergency Steel Loan Guarantee and the Emergency
Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Act of 1999, at http://204.193.246.62/public.nsf/
docs/4ADD963B76BBIB298525682E004F31EE (last visited Mar. 8, 2000).
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applications totaling over $68 million in requests had been received by the
Emergency Oil and Gas Loan Guarantee Board.66
4. Alternative Minimum Tax Adjustment
The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) is a heavy burden to the
American independent petroleum producer. Although "Itihe AMT was
enacted to make sure that companies reporting large financial income also
paid at least the prescribed minimum tax," it has increased "taxes on
companies that are... struggling financially or [it has] exacerbate[d] the
financial impact of falling commodity prices. ' "[T]he independent
petroleum producers of today.., face historically low market prices for
the products they sell.. ." while facing "numerous preference items under
the AMT."' '  Certain provisions under AMT, such as specified
preferences, could be phased down when prices fall below $23.50 a barrel
and perhaps completely eliminated when the price falls below $18.50 a
barrel.6 9 Such measures could be helpful to the American domestic
industry.
VII. CONCLUSION
When the price of crude oil fell below $10 a barrel in December 1998,
after a steady decline over eighteen years from $32 a barrel in 1981, the
businesses associated with the U.S. domestic crude oil production were
faced with potential extinction. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. domestic
jobs and a large sector of the U.S. economy were at stake. As is true with
most situations in life when one is seemingly at the end of the rope, one
sometimes will look for means that may have not been attempted
previously. This is what some of the American independent oil producers
did in 1999. Many of them came together, evaluated their operating
environment, and thought they found an inappropriate trade practice
aimed directly at them. They found a collusive effort by crude oil
producers who had excess capacity. The collusion, spawned by a strategic
initiative by Venezuelan-owned PDVSA and facilitated by the Mexican
Minister of Energy, was between Venezuela, Mexico, Iraq, and Saudi
166. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Emergency Oil and Gas Loan Guarantee Board Receives
Applications for $68 Million, at http://204.193.246.62/public.nsf/docs/A-F9B678C419
BBBB585256896005BBOF9 (last visited Mar. 8, 2000).
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Arabia. They began flooding the market with crude oil at a price which
would drive the American independents to plug their stripper wells.
The American independents saw this as an unfair trade practice and
decided to attack it. However, market dumping concepts had never been
applied to a commodity such as crude oil. So SDO was formed by the
independents to make their case in the established system of resolving
trade disputes, the mechanisms set up by the Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. SDO passed the hat and collected funds among themselves to hire
legal representation which would assist in petitioning Commerce for an
investigation.
However, from almost the beginning, the petition was apparently not
well received. Many commented that market dumping should not be
applied to crude oil production. The major oil producers had interests in
foreign oil production. The Clinton Administration was concerned about
international relations. So legal challenges to the petition were mounted.
Commerce, as it should, looked at SDO's standing and support from the
oil production industry. It appears that SDO's petition was given short
shrift. Finding ways to manipulate the support analysis, Commerce arrived
at the conclusion that pleased the Clinton Administration, the major
American oil producing companies, and the officials of the countries
named in the petition. The analysis was swift, and the decision rendered
promptly.
SDO's filing of a market dumping petition was unique. Though the
petition did not gain an official sanction, perhaps because of political
considerations, it did cause sufficient attention to the situation whereby the
involved oil producers changed their tactics. The use of an international
agreement apparently was a good avenue pursuit for the independents.
Oil prices are back up, and the independents' near-term survival is no
longer in question.
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